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However, compensation will be awarded under the peculiar
risk theory where there is a finding that the current of the stroke
is aided or assisted in some manner to seek out and land upon the
injured employee. For instance, in Bales v. Covington,4" an em-
ployee was struck by lightning while unharnessing his employer's
horses in a barn which had a metal roof. The court held that the
injury arose out of the employment on the ground that the barn aided
the lightning in seeking out the employee. Larson says that there
is a slow tendency to abandon the peculiar or increased risk test in
the act-of-God situation in favor of the actual risk or even positional
risk doctrines.49
The court could conclude under the actual risk test that where
an employee is required to work outdoors the danger of being struck
by lightning is an actual risk of the employment. Or compensation
could be awarded under the positional risk doctrine on the theory
that but for the fact that he was where he was required to be, he
would not have been struck by lightning.50 The choice of the test
to be used is really just a matter of how liberal the court feels in
carrying out the purposes of the Workmen's Compensation Statute.
RicnARD D. CooPER
TRAUMATIC PERSONAL INJURY: A DISCUSSION OF THE 1956
AMENDMENT TO THE KENTUCKY WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACT
Introduction
It is elementary that a claimant must show, among other things,
that he has sustained a personal injury in order to obtain an award
under workmen's compensation acts.1 More specifically, a claimant
in Kentucky must show that he suffered a "traumatic personal in-
jury" under the 1956 amendment to Kentucky Revised Statutes, sec.
342.005(1).2 The section now reads, as to the coverage of the act,
that:
It shall affect the liability of the employers subject thereto to their
employes for a traumatic personal injury sustained by the employe
by accident . . . arising out of and in the course of his employment
... provided, however, that "traumatic personal injury by accident"
as herein defined shall not include diseases except where the
48 812 Ky. 551, 228 S.W. 2d. 446 (1950).
49 1 Larson, op. cit. supra note 83, § 8.12.5o Ibid.
1 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 42.10 (1952).
2 Kentucky Acts 1956, ch. 77, § 1.
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disease is the natural and direct result of a traumatic injury by ac-
cident... 3 (Emphasis added.)
It is thus seen that prior to the amendment the act merely called for
a "personal injury." This deceptively simple requirement has in many
cases plagued the courts, and the problem it has presented is the
subject of this note. The problem arises in determining what kind
of injury is to be compensated, and the 1956 amendment, as will be
seen, was an attempt to solve that problem.
By virtue of the amendment it now appears that a "traumatic"
personal injury is required. What this means, however, must depend
on the intent of the legislature in passing the amendment. Since
there is no legislative history, such as committee reports and hear-
ings related to the adoption of the amendment, it is impossible to
find any objective factors which would indicate the intent of the
legislature. This has turned the writer to the only other avenues
open in an inquiry of this kind, that is, the existing case law on the
problem at the time of the amendment and the definition of the
word "traumatic." By this method some insight may be had as to
whether the legislature was attempting to change existing law, or
whether it was merely trying to clarify the existing language.
This note will fall into two parts: The first part will be an ex-
amination of the Kentucky cases prior to 1956 in order to determine
what kind of injury was required in order that compensation be
granted. This inquiry is important in that it will throw light upon
the intention of the legislature in inserting the word "traumatic".
The second part of the note will be devoted to a discussion of the
possible impact of the amendment on cases already decided, and
cases that may arise in the future.
Was Trauma Required Prior to 1956?
In early cases there was a great deal of controversy over whether
the "injury" must be of a traumatic nature,4 that is, an injury involv-
3 The original section reads:
It shall affect the liability of the employers subject thereto to their
employees for personal injuries sustained by the employee by accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment or for death result-
ing from such accidental injury; provided, however, that personal in-jury by accident as herein defined shall not include diseases except
where the disease is the natural and direct result of a traumatic in-jury by accident....
Kentucky Acts 1916, ch. 33, § 1. It is apparent from this section that trauma was
required to the extend that diseases were not to be compensated unless they
were the natural and direct result of a traumatic injury by accident. Subse-
quently an occupational disease section was passed, but there is still an area
of diseases that may not fall within the definition of an occupational disease, and
yet may be compensable if they are the result of a traumatic injury by accident.
The occupational disease section is Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.316 (1959).
4 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 42.11 (1952).
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ing physical contact that leads to a harmful change in the body. A
majority of statutes use the term "personal injury" or "injury" in the
coverage clause,5 while some of the acts require that the injury
result through violence to the physical structure of the body, or
trauma.0 Since the majority place emphasis on the word "injury"
alone, it is generally held that no physical trauma is required, but
that sunstroke, disease, and nervous collapse are injuries within
the acts.7
Prior to the 1956 Amendment, the Kentucky Act merely called
for a "personal injury" and it would thus seem that less stress would
be placed on the question of whether trauma was involved, and
more placed upon whether an "injury" had been sustained. How-
ever, the cases that were decided prior to 1956 led to some con-
fusion as to whether "trauma" was required.
In Straight Creek Fuel1 Co. v. Hunt," the deceased was struck
in the ribs and abdomen when he fell across a steel rail and died
twelve days later from paralysis of the bowels. The Board found
that the injury caused the death and granted compensation. The
defendant appealed on the ground that there was no evidence that
the worker died from a traumatic injury. The court concluded,
after a discussion of the definition of the word "traumatic," that an
internal injury resulting from an external force is a traumatic in-
jury, and that if such an internal injury results in death compensa-
tion should be granted. The court apparently assumed that a trau-
matic injury was required. It is true that in its discussion of the
word "traumatiy the court quoted from a "disease" case,9 but this
does not seem to counter the fact that the present case did not in-
volve a disease, but rather an ordinary injury. The attorneys for
the defendant expressly argued that there was no trauma which
resulted in death, and therefore the claimant's application for com-
pensation should be dismissed. The court rested its decision of the
case on a determination that there was a traumatic injury which
caused death. Therefore, this case is a strong precedent for the
proposition that an injury must be traumatic in order that compen-
sation be granted, though a stronger case would be presented if
compensation were denied because the injury was not traumatic.
There is another area of the law where the court seems to in-
timate collaterally that a traumatic injury is required by the statute.
This is the area of the so-called "apportionment" cases. No compen-
5 Id § 42.10.
64 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation-Text § 1240(e) (1945).
7 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 42.00 (1952).
8221 Ky. 265, 298 S.W. 686 (1927).
9 Jellico Coal Co. v. Adkins, 197 Ky. 684, 247 S.W. 972 (1923).
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sation may be awarded for the results of a pre-existing disease,10 and
where disability is traceable partly to pre-existing disease and partly
to an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of the em-
ployment, the court has held that it is the duty of the Board to
ascertain the facts and to apportion the award accordingly.11 This
simply means that the Board must determine the proportion of the
disability attributable to each of the two causes and then award
compensation for the portion attributable to the injury. This doc-
trine was urged upon the court in Wallins Creek Collieries Co. v.
Williams, but was rejected as inapplicable. In that case an employee
who had angina pectoris became ill and died after some strenuous
exertion. The court found that the death was caused solely by the
pre-existing disease and that no award should be made. The court
also rejected the doctrine of the cases wherein apportionment has
been allowed saying:
Neither do the facts of this case bring it within the [apportionment]
doctrine . . . (cases cited) wherein the results of the injuries were
apportioned between that which was produced by the prior disease
and that which was produced by the accident, and compensation
allowed for the latter only, since in each of those cases the alleged ac-
cident was not only an admitted and indisputable one, but it was a
traumatic injury, which was found to cooperate with the prior
existing disease to bring about the final result.
It is exceedingly doubtful if what happened to the employee,
Williams, in this case could be classified as an accident, it being
our opinion that it could not, but, without determining that ques-
tion (it not being necessary), it was certainly not a traumatic acci-
dent so as to permit the apportioning of the compensation and
allowing an award for whatever was produced by it. (Emphasis
added.)12
The cases distinguished, 13 where apportionment was allowed,
were all, save one,14 cases of genuine trauma wherein the traumatic
personal injury combined or concurred with the pre-existing disease to
1OKy. Rev. Stat. § 342.005(1) (1959).
11 Broughton's Adm'r v. Congleton Lumber Co., 285 Ky. 534, 31 S.W. 2d
903 (1930).12 211 Ky. 200, 203, 277 S.W. 234, 285 (1925).
13 These were the apportionment cases that were distinguished: B. F. Avery
& Sons v. Carter, 205 Ky. 548, 266 S.W. 50 (1924) (death caused by injury
from contact with molten metal combined with pre-existing diabetes). Employers
Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Gardner, 204 Ky. 216, 263 S.W. 743 (1924) (disability
caused by an injury due to a strain combined with pre-existing syphilis); Rob-
inson-Pettet Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Bd., 201 Ky. 719, 258 S.W. 318
(1924) (disability caused by an injury due to a fall combined with pre-existing
tuberculosis of the spine).
14The facts in Employers' Liability Assur. Corp. v. Gardner, 204 Ky. 216,
263 S.W. 748 (1924), may give rise to doubt as to whether what happened to
the claimant could be classified as a traumatic personal injury under any tenable
definition of "traumatic." Exertion causing a strain is a close case depending on
how broad the definition of "traumatic" is in the particular jurisdiction. This
problem will be taken up later in this note.
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cause the disability or death. Thus, the court seems to indicate that
there must be a trauma for a personal injury to be compensable and
thus qualify under the doctrine of apportionment. Since the court
did not find such an injury in the present case, the doctrine was not
applied.
Harlan Collieries Co. v. JohnsonA5 is another recent case where
it might seem that the court thought in terms of a traumatic injury.
In this case, the deceased, by mistake, drank a a strong acid solution
which resulted in serious burns to the mouth, throat, and stomach,
and some of the acid may have gotten into his lungs. The defend-
ants argued that the deceased had not suffered a traumatic injury
within the meaning of the act, but the court found no merit in the
argument. Finding expressly that trauma was present, the court
pointed out that there was no physical force or bodily blow, but
that under modem decisions the tendency was toward a more lib-
eral construction of the word "traumatic." In the present case, there
was direct physical injury resulting from the accident of drinking
the acid and this was trauma in the mind of the court.
Here again, however, there may be shadows of doubt in regard
to whether the court considered this an "injury" or a "disease" case.
The language in the opinion indicates that the court thought they
were dealing with an "injury," but because of certain aspects of the
opinion it could be considered a "disease" case. If it were the latter,
then an inquiry as to whether there was a traumatic injury would
be relevant since a disease (other than an occupational disease) to be
compensable must be the result of a traumatic injury by accident.16
In discussing the meaning of the word "traumatic," the court referred
to a "disease" case1 7 which might lead one to believe that the court
considered the present case as one involving a disease. The death
certificate listed the cause of death as "lung infection brought about
as accidental result of drinking strong alkali by mistake," and the
defendant contended that there was enough evidence of pre-exist-
ing tuberculosis to warrant apportionment of the award between
the injury and the pre-existing disease. However, the court held that
there was substantial evidence to warrant the Board's denial of
apportionment on the grounds that it was not shown that the tuber-
culosis was in fact pre-existing. The court's conclusion was that:
15808 Ky. 89, 212 S.W. 2d 540 (1948).
10Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.005 (1956).
17 Great AIt. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Sexton, 242 Ky. 266, 46 S.W. 2d 87 (1932).
Claimant contracted tularaemia (rabbit fever) through a pre-existing abrasion
on his finger while cleaning rabbits for his employer. The court found tat claim-
ant had contracted a disease via a traumatic injury. The merits of this case will
be discussed later in this note.
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Deceased suffered a painful and serious injury from the sudden
accident of drinking the acid and we hold that it was of traumatic
origin within the meaning of the statute. (Emphasis added.)18
It should be noted that no mention was made of the injury causing
a disease that led to death, but merely, that an injury of a traumatic
nature was inflicted. No mention is made of the disease sections of
the statute. It would, therefore, appear that the court again has
written "traumatic" into the statute, though his case is by no means
conclusive on that point.
Then came the case of Adams v. Bryant0 which clearly consti-
tuted a holding by the court that the statute merely called for a
"personal injury" and that no trauma was required where no disease
was present. In this case, the deceased died of overexertion, ex-
posure and nervous shock occasioned by his efforts in a mine-rescue
operation. The Board was of the opinion that the death was not the
result of a "personal injury sustained by the employee by accident"
since there was no trauma connected with the injury. The court
reversed on the ground that the cases relied upon by the Board
for the requirement of a traumatic injury were all cases where a
"disease" was involved, 20 and were, therefore, no authority for the
requirement of a traumatic injury where no disease was involved.
The court stated that where the word "injury" is used without any
qualifying words, such as "traumatic," it should be given its broadest
possible scope.2 1 The court then concluded:
[W]e are persuaded that the Legislature did not intend to limit in-
juries in the absence of a disease to only those injuries of a trau-
matic nature. Furthermore .. . we conclude that shock, overexertion
and exposure are personal injuries within the meaning of KRS842.005( 1).229
Thus the case seems to end any doubt as to the court's position
in regard to the construction of "personal injury" in the coverage
clause, though from the cases prior to this time there is reason to
doubt the conclusion of the court that the injury does not have to
be traumatic. This doubt is found in Judge Sims' dissenting opinion
18308 Ky. 89, 94, 212 S.W. 2d 540, 544 (1948).
19 274 S.W. 2d 791 (Ky. 1955). Opinion redelivered as of January 28, 1955.
20 Rue v. Kentucky Stone Co., 313 Ky. 568, 232 S.W. 2d 843 (1950); Cole-
man Mining Co. v. Wicks, 213 Ky. 134, 280 S.W. 936 (1926); Wallins Creek
Collieries Co. v. Williams, 211 Ky. 200, 277 S.W. 234 (1925).
No mention was made in the Adams case of Harlan Collieries Co.
v. Johnson, 308 Ky. 89, 212 S.W. 2d 540 (1948), or Straight Creek Fuel Co. v.
Hunt, 221 Ky. 265, 298 S.W. 686 (1927), where in it seemed that the court
was of the opinion that the injury was required to be traumatic.
.
1This seems to e the majority ,rul e as to construction in those states where
the term "injury" or persona injury" appears in the coverage clause. 1 Lar-
son, Workmen s Compensation § 42.00 (1952).2274 S.W. 2d 791, 793 (Ky. 1955).
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wherein he stated that he could find no trauma in the facts, evidently
meaning that in his mind the injury must be of a traumatic nature
to be compensable.
Impact of the Amendment
What change, if any, will be made upon existing case law due to
the insertion of the word "traumatic" into the coverage clause of the
statute? This question can only be answered by obtaining an answer
to another question, that is: What was the intent of the legislature
in passing the amendment? Since there are no committee reports to
guide one, some speculation will have to be engaged in. The Adams
case, which was decided in 1955, held that an injury was not re-
quired to be traumatic in the absence of a disease, and the amend-
ment inserting the word "traumatic" into the statute occurred in the
very next session of the General Assembly in 1956. Also, that part
of the statute involved here had read "personal injury," without the
qualifying word "traumatic," from the original Act of 1916 until
the 1956 amendment.23 The only reasonable conclusion or inference
that can be drawn from these facts is that the amendment of 1956
was designed to repeal the rule of Adams v. Bryant and to require
that an injury be traumatic in order for compensation to be granted.2 4
If the above conclusion be valid, what will be the impact of the
amendment, not only on cases with facts like those in the Adams
case, but also on cases that may arise in the future? The answer
to this question will depend upon what construction is given to the
word "traumatic." The Kentucky Court has had occasion to define
and apply this word in those cases where a disease was involved and,
by the express words of the statute, it was incumbent upon the claim-
ant to prove that his disease was the result of a traumatic injury
by accident.25 A perusal of these cases should be helpful in determ-
ining what construction and effect will be accorded the word in future
cases where an injury is involved.
Kentucky Cases on Trauma
The first case involving an interpretation of the word "traumatic'
was fellico Coal Co. v. Adkins, 26 wherein the claimant contracted
heart disease due to breathing "bad air" in a mine. In finding that
23Kentucky Acts 1916, ch. 38, see. 1. See n. 8 supra.24 T. M. Crtitcher Dental Depot v. Miller, 251 Ky. 201, 206, 207, 64 S.W. 2d
466, 468 (1988).
25 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 842.316 (1959) now provides for compensation for occu-
pational diseases. There still remains the problem of a wide variety of diseases
which are not occupational within the meaning of the statute. Death or dis-
ability from such diseases, now as before the 1956 amendment, is compensated
under Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.005.
26197 Ky. 684, 247 S.W. 972 (1923).
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the disease was not the result of a traumatic injury, the court reviewed
several dictionary definitions of the word "traumatic" and concluded:
It will be observed that all of these definitions of "trauma" and
"traumatic" imply the presence of physical force, and this is the
generally accepted meaning of the word. Evidently the act implies
that some external physical force actually directed against the body
must occur in order to constitute traumatic injury by accident ...
(Emphasis added. )27
Obviously, this is a very narrow concept of trauma but it was broad
enough to cover the injury involved in Straight Creek Fuel Co. v.
Hunt, 1 and the court in this later case seemed to adopt the pre-
vious construction of the word in the Adkins case. Then, in Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Sexton,29 the concept was clearly
broadened. In this case the claimant was dressing rabbits infected
with tularemia germs and they entered his system through a pre-
existing cut on his finger resulting in the claimant contracting "rabbit
fever." The court was faced with the question whether or not the
disease was the result of a traumatic injury by accident, which it
answered in the affirmative. In discussing the meaning of the word
"traumatic" the court referred to its decisions in the Adkins and
Hunt cases, supra. It noted that in those cases reference had been
made to Webster's definition of "trauma" as "a wound or injury
directly produced by causes external to the body." Commenting
upon this definition, the court stated:
It will be noted that this does not include within its scope and
meaning only physical force in the sense of a blow, a current of
electricity, or like terms implying power, vigor, violence, or energy
in the commonly accepted meaning of those terms, but may be as
consistently construed to include any independent influence or causes
external to the body coming into direct contact with, and causing
injury to, the physical structures thereof. (Emphasis added.)30
It is evident that this definition greatly broadens the concept of
trauma by making the word synonymous with any independent
influence or cause. External physical force is not required in order
that trauma be present according to this definition. The Adkins and
Hunt cases required that for an injury to be traumatic there must
be an external physical force. The Sexton case extended this to any
external force or influence, physical or not.31
Coming back to the specific application of the word "traumatic"
27 Id. at 688, 247 S.W. at 794.
28221 Ky. 265, 298 S.W. 686 (1927). Here the injury was definitely of a
traumatic nature. Claimant fell across a steel rail, so that the narrow construction
of the word in the Adkins case did not have to be extended.
29 242 Ky. 266, 46 S.W. 2d 87 (1932).
3O Id. at 271, 46 S.W. 2d at 89.
31 See People v. Bums, 88 Cal. App. 2d 867, 200 P. 2d 134 (1948).
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in the Sexton case, there seems to be some confusion as to what
constituted the trauma. It is possible that the germs coming into contact
with the membranes of the body through the pre-existing abrasion
could satisfy the trauma requirement, though at least one court has
distinguished between medical and legal trauma, holding that medi-
cal trauma produced by a microbe or a microscopic foreign substance
coming in contact with an uninjured mucous membrane is not such
trauma as is contemplated by workmen's compensation law. 2 But
in a later case83 , in which the claimant had contracted typhoid fever
from drinking contaminated water, the Kentucky Court distinguished
the Sexton case. They noted that in Sexton the germs entered through
an abrasion, but in the case before them the germs entered through
a normal channel of entry and were absorbed into the system. The
court held that in the latter situation there was no trauma but said
that in Sexton there had been. This seems to rule out the possibility
that the requirement of trauma is satisfied by germs coming into
contact with healthy tissue of the body. Where then was the trauma
in Sexton? The court evidently considered that the abrasion con-
stituted the trauma, but this seems indefensible since by the court's
own admission the abrasion did not arise out of and in the course of
claimant's employment, but was inflicted at his home while cutting
kindling. Had claimant broken the skin by a blow while at his
employment, and germs entered by that route, it could be said that
a traumatic injury by accident had occurred, which resulted in a
disease. However, the holding of the court that trauma was present
on the facts in Sexton appears questionable. Even if the germs com-
ing in contact with healthy tissue could constitute trauma, where was
the injury which led to a disease? This is what the words of the act
seem to require. Here a distinction should be drawn between injury
and disease, but the court treats them as one and the same. 4 The
germs caused a disease and the act did not then treat injury and disease
as the same, since it required that the disease be the result of a
traumatic injury by accident. This confusion led the court to mis-
apply the Sexton case in a later case3 5 wherein the deceased died
from pneumonia and gangrene occasioned by breathing sawdust
into his lungs. The court found that Sexton was squarely in point
and controlling. But the distinction is fairly obvious, for in the one
case germs came into contact with healthy tissue and caused a dis-
32 1ndustrial Commn. v. Armacost, 129 Ohio St. 176, 194 N.E. 23 (1935).
33 Mills v. Columbia Gas Const. Co., 246 Ky. 464, 55 S.W. 2d 394 (1932).34 Industrial Comm'n v. Cross, 104 Ohio St 561, 136 N.E. 283 (1922). This
case points up the distinction between disease and injury.35 Schabel v. Riddell-Robincan Mfg. Co., 245 Ky. 409, 53 S.W. 2d 750
(1932).
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ease, while in the other case, sawdust, with its irritating qualities,
came in contact with healthy tissue and caused an injury, which led
to infection and pneumonia causing death. The cases, once this dis-
tinction is observed, should be less conflicting and more in accord
with the provisions of the act.
It can be concluded at this point that the definition of "traumatie"
by the Kentucky Court is very broad as the Sexton case illustrates.36
This breadth of meaning will be helpful in future cases when it may
be urged that the insertion of the word into the coverage clause
has a restrictive effect on the scope of coverage in certain types of
injuries.
Overexertion, Exposure and Shock
This was the type of injury involved in Adams v. Bryant and, as
previously concluded, the amendment to Kentucky Revised Statute,
sec. 342.005(1) was intended to reverse the holding in Adams by re-
quiring that an injury to be compensable must be traumatic.
At the outset, before discussing whether the type of injury in-
volved in Adams is traumatic, the phrase "overexertion, exposure and
shock" should be examined. The court calls these things injuries,
but upon closer examination this appears to be a misnomer in some
respects. Exertion is defined by Webster to be an "active exercise
of any power or faculty,"3 7 thus overexertion would be an over-
active exercise of any power or faculty. Is this an injury? It does
not seem possible that it could be, but the effects of overexertion
could be, for example, a general break down of the vital bodily pro-
cesses as the result of overexertion. Thus, overexertion may be the
cause of an injury, but it cannot be of itself an injury. This same
reasoning seems to apply to exposure. One may die from the effects
of exposure, but exposure is a cause of an injury, not the injury
itself. For example, if one is exposed to sub-freezing temperatures in
improper clothing for an appreciable period of time, a definite body
reaction occurs, that is, the blood pressure is lowered and a gen-
eral deterioration of bodily processes takes place. But it should be
noted that the result of the exposure is the injury and not the ex-
posure itself. Lastly, the word "shock" can apply to both cause and
effect. Webster defines shock as an "impact, collision or... sudden
36 For jurisdictions that attribute a narrower meaning to the word "trau-
matic" see, People v. Bums, 88 Cal. App. 2d 867, 200 P. 2d 184 (1948); Higgins
v. Department of Labor & Indus., 27 Wash. 2d 816, 180 P. 2d 559 (1947).
37 Webster, New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1944). See also, 3 Mur-
ray, A New English Dictionary (1897) "the action or habit of exerting or putting
into active operation (an organ, the faculties, or habit of the body of mind)";
American College Dictionary (1955) "exercise, as of power or faculties"; Web-
ster New Collegiate Dictionary (1953) "Act of exerting; exercise of any power
or Yaculty .. "
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and violent agitation of the mental or emotional sensibilities,SS and
these can clearly constitute the causes of injuries to the bodily struc-
ture. Yet, shock in the medical sense can also be the injury since
it is a "state of profound depression of the vital processes of the
body characterized by... rapid but weak pulse... shallow respira-
tion"30 and a general deterioration of the bodily processes which can
and does in many cases lead to death. Shock may be the result of a
wound or crushing injury and is therefore a type of injury in itself.
Can such causes of injuries as overexertion, exposure and shock
(used in the sense of cause) be classified as traumatic in nature?
This is the question that will have to be answered when facts similar
to those in Adams v. Bryant are presented again. According to the
last authoritative definition by the court in the Sexton case, trauma is
"any independent influence or cause external to the body coming into
direct contact with, and causing injury to, the physical structure."
The breadth of this definition could easily make the causes of injury
in Adams classifiable as traumatic. Obviously exposure may satisfy
even a narrow interpretation of trauma, since something of a physical
nature comes into contact with the body, i.e., cold or heat coming
into contact with the body and resulting in injury to the physical
structure. Examples of such injuries would be frostbite, burns, heat
which leads to exhaustion, and even shock (used in the result sense).
The causes of these types of injuries could be classified as thermal
trauma.4
0
Exertion which results in something breaking, herniating, or
38 Webster, New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1944). See also, 8 Mur-
ray, A New English Dictionary, pt. 2 (1897) "a sudden and violent blow, impact,
or collision, tending to overthrow or to produce internal oscillation in a body sub-jected to it"; Webster, New Collegiate Dictionary (1953) "a blow, impact; colli-
sion or violent shake... "30 Webster, New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1944); 8 Murray, A New
English Dictionary, pt. 2 (1914). "A sudden and disturbing impression on the
mind or feelings; usually, one produced by some unwelcome occurrence or per-
ception, by pain, grief, or violent emotion . . . and tending to occasion lasting
depression or loss of composure ... "; See also, Dorland, Illustrated Medical
Dictionary (28d ed. 1957) "A condition of acute peripheral circulatory failure
due to derangement of circulatory control or loss of circulating fluid and brought
about by injury. It is marked by pallor and clamminess of the skin, decreased
blood pressure, feeble rapid R ulse, decreased respiration, restlessness, anxiety
and sometimes unconsciousness ; Blawiston, New Gould Medical Dictionary (2d
ed. 1956) "The clinical manifestations of an inadequate volume of circulatingblood.. Signs include marked decrease in blood pressure, weak thready pulse,
pale cold skin .. " See also, Cox, Shock Takes Varied Forms, Doctors Warn,
Louisville Courier-Journal Apr. 5, 1959, § 4, p. 5, col. 5.40 
"Trauma can be Jefined as injury to the body inflicted by some form of
outside force. It is divided into four categories: 1. Physical trauma, caused by
physical violence; 2. Thermal trauma, caused by heat or cold; 3. Electrical
trauma, caused by electrical energy; 4. Chemical trauma, caused by poisons."
Henry v. A. C. Lawrence Leather Co., 234, N.C. 126, 66 S.E. 2d 693, 696
(1951).
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letting go has been held compensable in a majority of jurisdictions.41
Yet, is the exertion which causes the breakage a trauma? Under the
definition of "traumatic" in the Sexton case there must be an inde-
pendent cause or influence coming into direct contact with the body.
As broad as this definition is, there may be difficulty in finding that
exertion can be trauma within the act, unless one considers the
object of the exertion the independent influence or cause. In the
Adams case, the deceased worked feverishly to remove his friends from
a mine cave-in and undoubtedly used his hands to remove debris.
Since the exertion was directed towards something external to the
body, can this satisfy the "independent influence or cause" require-
ment? Such a rationalization appears to be rather weak and leaves
much to be desired in the way of a realistic theory to decide the
cases on. However, one court has met this problem head-on and has
adopted a more realistic theory in deciding cases involving strain,
exertion and similar causes of injury.42 In that case the claimant
was suffering from tenosynovitis or inflammation of a synovial mem-
brane which is a protective sheath that encloses the tendons in one's
arm. The inflammation arose from the nature of claimant's work
which required the constant lifting of weight with the result that the
tendons and tendon sheaths were stretched by repeated overflexion
or overextension. In this particular jurisdiction tenosynovitis was an
occupational disease, if caused by trauma. Thus, the issue was squarely
presented whether this constant strain and exertion which led to in-
flammation could be classified as traumatic. In answering this prop-
osition in the affirmative the court turned to authoritative definitions
of medical trauma and quoted from the expert testimony:
"Wound or injury is trauma, but not all trauma comes under that
classification. Wound or injury as the meaning of the word trauma
in the medical sense is not all-inclusive .... Repeatedly putting the
elbow through motions, to call that trauma would not be a misuse
of the word medically .... And Dr. Lancaster testified: "I would
say that tenosynovitis could not result from repeated external trauma.
... I don't think this condition could result without the intervention
of some unusual strain or use of that particular tendon. . . . The
trauma would be the continuous stretching and pulling of that
particular ligament in his occupation." 43
The analogy to the exertion cases is obvious and it seems that such
a rationale could be helpful in construing the word "traumatic" to
include exertion in those cases where the exertion can be shown
41 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 88.20 (1952). For Kentucky cases
see, McKnelly v. Gaddis, 309 Ky. 698, 218 S.W. 2d 1 (1949); Kroger Grocery
& Baking Co. v. Bartle, 250 Ky. 658, 63 S.W. 2d 807 (1933).42 Henry v. A. C. Lawrence Leather Co., 234 N.C. 126, 66 S.E. 2d 693
(1951).
43 id., 66 S.E. 2d at 695. 696.
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to have caused breakage or a general detrimental effct on the
physical structure of the body.
As previously concluded, shock in the medical sense is an injury,
yet, it can also be a cause of injury. This raises the problem of
whether shock, used in the sense of cause, can be classified as trau-
matic in nature. Obviously shock frequently involves no physical
contact with the body although there is no question but that a defi-
nite ascertainable reaction develops from severe nervous shock which
could constitute an injury, such as a neurosis or shock (used in the
result sense). 44 The broad definition of "traumatic" in the Sexton
case would justify construing trauma to include shock since an inde-
pendent influence or cause results in injury, but here again a trouble-
some problem arises because under the rule in Sexton the independent
influence or cause must come into direct contact with the body. In
the case of nervous shock there has been direct contact of light waves
or sound waves with the body to the extent that a person sees or hears
facts which have an injurious physical effect. But is this enough? In
Bailey v. American General Insurance Co.,45 where shock of a visual
nature resulted in a neurosis, the medical expert talked in terms of
"psychic trauma" and "traumatic experience." Admittedly a rationale
based on "psychic trauma" is some distance apart from the old-fash-
ioned notion of trauma being physical contact, but it illustrates cur-
rent thinking on this concept and can be useful in carrying out the
intent and spirit of the Workmen's Compensation Act.40 In cases of
shock there is a definite impact on the nervous system created by
what may be called a "traumatic experience." This impact leads to
obvious physical harm and injury just as physical impact does and
the spirit of the act seems to demand that both be compensated. In
such cases such terminology as "psychic trauma" and "traumatic ex-
perience" can be very helpful in this area of the law.
Conclusion
These are just a few of the problems that may arise when the
court comes to apply the amendment. It is apparent that it is diffi-
cult to find trauma in cases of overexertion, exposure and shock, but
as the previous discussion indicates trauma may be so construed as
44 Bailey v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 279 S.W. 2d 315 (Tex. Sup. 1955). For
comments on this case, see 34 Tex. L. Rev. 496 (1956), and 53 Mich. L. Rev.
898 (1955), which commented on the lower court opinion which was eventually
reversed.45 Supra note 44.
46Dorland, Illustrated Medical Dictionary (23 ed. 1957) (psychic shock in
the sense of result) "a shock like condition produced by strong emotion."; Blak-
iston, New Gould Medical Dictionary (2d ed. 1956) (psychic shock in the
sense of cause) "a physical or emotional trauma.
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to include these causes of injury, without stretching the word com-
pletely out of shape. The broad definition of "traumatic" expounded
in the Sexton case is fortunate since it will give the court a flexible
definition to work with when it is confronted with the new trauma
requirement in cases that will arise in the future. It is important that
these first cases be carefully rationalized in respect to the trauma re-
quirement for, if too narrow a definition is used, the court may find
itself handcuffed by its own language in later cases when a more
flexible meaning of traumatic is needed to carry out the spirit of the
act. Modem medical terminology is solidly behind a broad meaning
of "traumatic" and courts which appreciate this will have little diffi-
culty in construing the word so that the spirit and purpose of the
Workmen's Compensation Act can be implemented.
H. Wendell Cherry
